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Art History and Cultural Difference: Alfred Gell’s Anthropology of Art 
 
Matthew Rampley 
 
One of the most pressing issues currently confronting the theory and history of art is the 
question of cultural difference. Specifically, what are the implications of the difference 
between western and non-Western cultures for the task of visual and artistic analysis? In 
what ways is it possible to undertake cross-cultural analysis while remaining within the 
frame of art history – a set of discourses originally formulated to account for the 
development of Western art? 
 
The responses to this question have been varied, ranging from an emphasis on the complete 
incommensurability of different cultures to ambitious attempts at constructing world art 
histories. In this article I examine the work of one particular author – the anthropologist 
Alfred Gell (1945-1997) – and his contribution to discussion on this issue. As I argue, Gell 
offers some potentially significant ways of rethinking this question, and specifically, his 
work offers the outline of a possible form of cross-cultural analysis that avoids some of the 
pitfalls that have beset previous such attempts. I analyse Gell in detail shortly, but before 
doing so, offer a brief overview of the current state of critical debate on the issue. 
 
Questions of Cultural Difference 
 
Published in: Art History Vol. 28 No. 4 (Autumn 2005) pp. 524-51. 
 
2 
 
At the root of the topic of cultural difference are a number of inter-related questions. In 
particular: to what extent is it possible to refer to art as a cross-cultural category? Further: 
to what extent is it possible to speak of aesthetic judgement and value as cross-cultural 
categories and, finally, to what extent is it possible to construct a cross-cultural history of 
art? The histories of art of the nineteenth century which, from Hegel onwards, attempted to 
encompass all art within a single universal narrative, have long been recognised as deeply 
problematic.
1
 Although they have persisted into the twentieth century, this is now mostly a 
matter of pedagogical and organisational convenience, rather than being based on any 
larger, substantive claim about the common developmental logic of world art.
2
 Perhaps the 
last attempt to construct a comprehensive history of art around a single narrative thread was 
Ernst Gombrich’s History of Art, first published in 1950, yet subsequently Gombrich 
proved to be one of the most trenchant critics of Hegel and the legacy of Hegelianism in art 
history.
3
 
 
While such universal histories of art can be regarded largely as a historical relic from an 
earlier phase in the discipline’s development, historical scholarship on non-Western art has, 
in contrast, flourished. Until recently the legitimacy of art history as a frame of analysis 
has, on the whole, been uncontested; at stake have merely been questions of relative 
cultural and aesthetic value. Relativism has played an important role in scrutinising the 
values implicit in art historical judgements, but it has left the category of ‘art’ untouched. 
When the latter is also subjected to analysis, more disturbing problems are then raised. The 
category of ‘art’ presents difficulties both in terms of the pragmatics of non-Western art 
histories and also in terms of the sociological and philosophical recognition of its cultural 
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and historical specificity. Hence, scholarship on non-Western art is faced with a domain of 
objects that do not equate with the practices that were the traditional object of European 
and American art history. Thus ‘Japanese art,’ for example, comprises, as well as the more 
familiar media of print, painting, sculpture and architecture, suits of armour, ceramic, 
bronze and wood vessels, gardens, furniture and dress, none of which figure in traditional 
histories of Western art.
4
 Moreover this lack of ‘fit’ does not indicate the existence of a 
distinct notion of art in Japan; it is a function of the reverse, namely, the lack of an 
overarching conception of ‘art’ in pre-modern Japanese society and hence the difficulties 
raised when the Western observer attempts to construct one. A similar problem can be 
observed in accounts of art in South Asia, which focus on sculpture, architecture and 
painting to the exclusion of dance and music, for example, even though the latter are as 
significant a part of visual culture as work in other media.5  
 
Such comparisons heighten the sense of the specificity of art as a category of analysis; 
emerging in Europe during the Renaissance, it gained institutional and philosophical 
legitimation in the eighteenth century through both the reduction of the various disparate 
arts to one single principle, and also the highlighting of the particular kind of experience – 
aesthetic - prompted by the encounter with art.
6
 This latter issue is of key importance, for it 
addresses both cross-cultural viability of the concept of aesthetic experience and also its 
role in the understanding of art. In the wake of the work of Pierre Bourdieu and others it 
has been widely accepted that despite claims to the universality of aesthetic judgement, it is 
in fact a product of the European and North American Enlightenment, an inflexion of 
bourgeois ideologies of freedom and autonomy.
7
 Consequently, the idea of aesthetic 
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experience is alien to most (but not all) non-Western cultures, a view that has led to stress 
on the embeddedness of art within broader cultural values and meanings that outstrip purely 
aesthetic appearance.
8
  Hence, judgements that initially appear to approximate to the 
aesthetic concerns of the Western observer are in fact deeply imbricated in wider social, 
political and religious values. 
 
This last point is crucial, for traditional histories of non-Western art – and studies in the 
cognate field of the anthropology of art – have been concerned primarily with the 
articulation and analysis of the aesthetic value system motivating the production and 
reception of artworks (I leave aside for the moment the problematic question of the 
definition of ‘artwork’). Such a conception also views artworks as instances of an a priori 
general set of aesthetic codes and values. In contrast, however, not only does ‘art’ turn out 
to be an elusive cultural category, with no evident commensurability between different 
societies in terms of its object domain, but also assumptions about the aesthetic basis of art 
become open to question.  
 
Recently, a further criticism of the idea of global art history has been articulated by James 
Elkins, and this turns on the question of historicity.
9
 The idea of a developmental history 
has been central to the self-understanding of European art since the Renaissance – and 
possibly also in classical antiquity - and this has also framed accounts of non-Western art.10 
These have often relied on periodisation and tracing of developmental sequences of styles 
in order to map out the art historical terrain. Yet as Elkins has pointed out, this is distinctive 
to Europe and North America; for most cultures the idea of a history of art is alien. In 
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societies where art is an adjunct of, for example, religion, the idea of a specifically artistic 
history is meaningless; in others, and he cites the example of the late-sixteenth century 
Persian writer Qādī Ahmad’s manuscript Calligraphers and Painters (ca. 1596-97), there 
may be a sense of a tradition of artists, but this takes the form of a chronicle, rather than a 
notion of progressive endeavour.11 
 
The common thread to all of these criticisms has thus been an emphasis on cultural 
incommensurability and difference, and they have been part of what has been referred to 
more generally – and erroneously - as the ethnographic turn.
12
 If accepted, they make for 
troubling reading, for they challenge the legitimacy of vast areas of established and widely 
disseminated scholarship. They also close off the possibilities of cross-cultural dialogue, for 
implicit is the notion that certain cultural differences are so vast, their traditions so 
incommensurable, as to present an unbridgeable gap between the (Western) observer and 
the observed.  
 
Such a stress on cultural incommensurability has itself been subject to scrutiny, however. In 
his study of image-making in sixteenth-century China, for example, Craig Clunas has 
argued, that there were distinct parallels between China and Renaissance Italy in terms of 
the cultural meaning and value of painting; paintings were valued commodities, exchanged 
by means of a complex art market and supported by a tradition of connoisseurship.13 In 
China there was also a flourishing enterprise in the production of copies and counterfeits of 
celebrated paintings, indicating a conception of a canonical tradition of masterworks, 
accompanied by an equal concern with the authenticity of artworks that displays important 
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similarities with the contemporary situation in Italy and elsewhere in Europe. Similar 
comparative studies have explored parallels with sixteenth and seventeenth-century Japan, 
while the profession of artist has proven as amenable to analysis in the Chinese context as 
the professional art world of the West.14 In other words, it is possible to overstate cultural 
differences and ignore substantial commonalities, in terms of both the cultural value and 
meaning ascribed to art, and also its social and political function. The employment of art in 
the construction of national identities, for example, can be observed as clearly in 
eighteenth-century Japan as it can in Europe and America.
15
 
 
There have also been significant recent renewed attempts to construct cross-cultural 
aesthetics and art histories. Richard Anderson’s Calliope’s Sisters undertakes the ambitious 
project of a comparative study of, for example, Aztec, Navajo, Inuit and Yoruba aesthetic 
systems in order to support a general thesis about the cross-cultural applicability of the 
notions of art and aesthetic judgement, even though aesthetic values may be specific to 
each culture.
16
 Despite considerable cultural differences, the common factor is the skilful 
encoding of culturally significant meaning in sensuous form. What distinguish art from 
non-art are its semantic density and its referential character. As Anderson states:  
 
… in addition to an art work’s being “about” its own stylistic conventions and the 
emotional response that its use of a sensuous medium can evoke, it is also “about” 
some subject in the sociocultural matrix of which it is a part.
17
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More recently, David Summers’ vast study Real Spaces has attempted to lay the 
groundwork of a ‘post-formalist’ art history by reference to the phenomenology of Martin 
Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
18
 For Summers the fundamental basis of a world 
art history is the role of art in articulating embodied experience, and in particular the 
experience of space. This may occur either in terms of real space – as in the case of 
architecture – or virtual space – as in the case of images.  
 
These accounts lay down an important challenge to the emerging consensus that privileges 
cultural difference over commensurability. However, the difficulty with both is that what 
they identify as the cross-cultural basis of analysis is so open and generalised as to be easily 
overwritten (and hence lost) by the specificities of each individual culture. Understanding 
of the sociocultural matrix that is the object of art for Anderson may vary so much between 
cultures as still to result in incommensurable practices. Likewise, the embodied experience 
of space emphasised by Summers may be given completely incommensurate symbolic 
articulations in different cultures. There is also no guarantee that what Summers identifies 
as the basic character of embodied space is not itself a culturally specific projection.
19
  
 
Yet if such renewed attempts to establish some form of global aesthetics or art history face 
important difficulties, the emphasis on cultural incommensurability is equally problematic. 
Its radical particularism, stressing the absolute heterogeneity and incommensurability of 
visual practices of different cultures, militates against the possibility of comparison to 
highlight either similarities or differences. As Donald Davidson has argued, it is only 
against a background of assumed commonalities that meaningful differences can emerge as 
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differences.
20
 Identification of commensurability or incommensurability is only possible by 
reference to some tertium comparationis. Ironically, too, the reflexive critique by Bourdieu 
and others of the ideology of the aesthetic in Western societies, though often mobilised in 
support of this argument against cross-cultural aesthetics, ultimately ends up confirming 
their possibility. As a bourgeois ideological projection, aestheticised ‘art’ does not even 
exist in Western culture; the appeal to aesthetic judgement is primarily a strategy to 
disavow the social functions of art, beginning with social stratification of taste.
21
 Most non-
Western societies do not have an aestheticised concept of art, but then, it turns out, neither 
do Western societies. Such a dismantling of the aesthetic from within thus throws open the 
possibility of cross-cultural analysis, but on some other basis than that of aesthetic value 
and meaning. 
 
Gell, Methodological Philistinism and the Anthropology of Art  
 
It is within this context of debate that I wish to discuss the work of Gell. In the 
anthropology of art Gell has achieved a near cult status, but the details of this thought are 
little known in other disciplines, and in particular, in art history. This is surprising, for 
while much of his writing focuses on art in small-scale societies, his interventions into the 
anthropology of art are informed, in part, by a recurring interest in twentieth-century 
European art and, in part, by a recurring engagement with art historical literature. His 
approach to the study of decoration, for example, is highly influenced by Gombrich’s The 
Sense of Order.
22
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A lecturer first at the University of Sussex and then the Australian National University in 
Sydney, he was, from 1979 until his death in 1997, based at the London School of 
Economics. He was the author of a number of books – on the anthropology of time, art and 
ritual in New Guinea, and tattooing in Polynesia – but it is his final two works, Art and 
Agency (1998) written while he was dying of cancer, and The Art of Anthropology (1999), a 
posthumous collection of essays, that have had the greatest impact.
23
 It is in these that he 
comes nearest to devising a systematic anthropological theory of art and accordingly I 
focus on them.  
 
A distinctive feature of Gell’s writing is his critique of traditional anthropology of art for 
not being anthropological enough. This criticism is directed primarily at the tradition of 
equating it with the mapping of artworks onto relevant systems of aesthetic values. As Gell 
notes: ‘One of my basic objections to the “cross-cultural aesthetics” and “semiotics” 
theories of ethnographic art is that the theoretical affinities of these approaches lie in 
(Western) aesthetics and art theory, not autonomously within anthropology itself.’
24
  
 
For Gell, if a theory is to count as an anthropological account of art, it should resemble 
anthropological discourses on other phenomena, such as religion, kinship, or ritual. This 
may appear to be rooted in a curious concern with disciplinary propriety, but it underpins a 
number of important critical points. Indeed, Gell focuses on the ghettoisation of 
‘ethnographic art’ within anthropological discourse, and on the identification of 
‘ethnographic art’ with the object of a museological gaze. This criticism derives from his 
argument that anthropology should be understood as social anthropology; as such its 
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primary object is the analysis of social relations. The traditional anthropology of art he 
accuses of being ‘essentially geared to refining and expanding the aesthetic sensitivities of 
the Western art public by providing a cultural context within which non-Western art objects 
can be assimilated to the categories of Western aesthetic art-appreciation.’25 It is in this 
context that he calls for ‘methodological philistinism,’ a turning of attention away from the 
aesthetic properties of the artwork and towards its role within social relations. 
  
‘Philistinism’ has come to play an important role in recent polemics against aesthetic theory 
and value,
26
 but for Gell it denotes the requirement that the anthropology of art adopt the 
same detachment from its object as the anthropological study of other domains of social 
practice. Just as the anthropology of religion proceeds on the basis of ‘methodological 
atheism’ – i.e. suspense of belief in the religion concerned – so the anthropology of art 
should withdraw from aestheticism, adopting ‘an attitude of resolute indifference towards 
the aesthetic value of works of art.’
27
  
 
For all his protestations regarding disciplinary propriety, Gell’s position is influenced here 
by the anti-aesthetic turn in art criticism. Much of his writing he demonstrates a sustained 
interest in twentieth-century Western art and, in particular, in Marcel Duchamp, whose 
work clearly informs many of Gell’s criticisms. While anthropology is often still trapped in 
a nineteenth-century notion of ethnographic art as comprising collectible, aesthetically 
striking, artefacts (tribal art) amenable to display in the museum, Duchamp had indicated 
the expanded definitions of art, which Gell himself takes up, nominating the cattle of the 
Dinka, for example, or hunting traps as art.
28
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In his critique of aestheticism, and in his stress on the role of art in social transactions, 
Gell’s work is influenced by Pierre Bourdieu.
29
 ‘Methodological philistinism,’ for example, 
recalls Bourdieu and Darbel’s notion of the de-aestheticised, intellectual ‘love’ of art.30 
Gell’s work, however, focuses on art within micro-social events and relations. This sets him 
apart from Bourdieu, who highlights the operation of larger scale social structures, 
institutions and fields. For Gell the aim of the anthropology of art is not to consider 
indigenous systems governing the evaluation and understanding of art objects, but rather to 
analyse the function of art as an active participant in social interactions. As Gell states: 
‘The simplest way to imagine this is to suppose that there could be a species of 
anthropological theory in which persons or “social agents” are, in certain contexts, 
substituted for by art objects.’31 
 
The starting point is the concept of enchantment, and the idea of art as a technology of 
enchantment. These two notions are intended to overcome the traditional opposition 
between Western (aestheticised) art object and non-Western (functional) artefact. Rather 
than asserting the irreducible difference between the two, Gell reframes the terms of 
comparison. At the root of this is an insistence on the ‘enchanting’ function of the artwork 
by virtue of the technical efficacy required for its production; both the aesthetic attitude and 
the attribution of magical and ritual properties to non-Western artefacts are species of 
technological enchantedness. The artist becomes a kind of occult technician. As a 
technology of the radical transformation of materials, art attains a kind of ‘halo effect’ 
through its sheer complexity; the viewer is awed or baffled when faced with the technical 
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virtuosity of the art object. Gell sees an example in the canoe prows of the Trobriand 
islanders (Figure 1), and it is the ‘halo effect’ that functions as the basis of art’s social 
efficacy. It serves to impress or even intimidate the viewer; in his earlier study of 
Polynesian tattooing Gell writes of its role in seducing others.32 Gell thereby expands the 
idea of technology of enchantment to encompass ‘all those technical strategies, especially 
art, music, dances, rhetoric, gifts etc., which human beings employ in order to secure the 
acquiescence of other people in their intentions or projects.’
33
 As such, it belongs within a 
taxonomy of technologies that also includes those of production and re-production. 
 
It is tempting to interpret this as a restatement, albeit in an unfamiliar idiom, of a well-
established argument to do with the role of art in the securing and legitimising of social 
hegemonies. The idea of the ‘halo effect’ is reminiscent, for example, of Walter Benjamin’s 
analysis of the role of artistic aura in both maintaining the object’s authority and sustaining 
existing social and class identities.
34
 However, Gell focuses on cultures where, in the 
absence of the institutionalised aesthetic gaze, enchantment is coded in terms of magical 
rather than aesthetic experience. Specifically: 
 
… magical technology is the reverse side of productive technology, and … this 
magical technology consists of representing the technical domain in enchanted 
form. If we return to the idea … that what really characterizes art objects is they 
way they tend to transcend the technical schemas of the spectator, his normal sense 
of self-possession, then we can see that there is a convergence between the 
characteristics of objects produced via the enchanted technology of art and objects 
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produced through the enchanted technology of magic and that, in fact, these 
categories tend to coincide.
35
  
 
In other words, the technical skill involved in the production of art objects is of an order 
that leads the viewer to suppose its basis in magic. The speculation that animal traps might 
be considered as artworks can now be brought into play, but in a transformed manner: the 
social efficacy of art is founded in its function as a cognitive trap; it seduces and 
overwhelms the viewer. In Art and Agency this becomes the basis for a reading of 
apotropaic symbols and images. Rather than warding off evil spirits, such devices entrap 
them with the same cognitive bafflement as would beset any human viewer. The apotropaic 
device is a kind of ‘demonic flypaper;’ by captivating potential demons it renders them 
harmless, a quality Gell generalises as the ‘viscous’ quality of all art. 
 
This account appears to aim at describing certain kinds of non-Western cultures, but it is a 
much wider phenomenon than Gell’s apparent interest in the Trobriand Islands would 
initially indicate. In particular, despite the modernist negation of traditional academic skill, 
admiration of technical virtuosity still plays a significant part in the response to art objects 
in contemporary Western cultures. It is observable empirically in popular responses to 
artists whose work is deemed ‘skilful’ – from Chuck Close to Andreas Gursky or Jan 
Vermeer. In addition, the exercise of skill has remained a persistent element in numerous 
aesthetic and art theories. It even appears in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement. 
For the latter, skill is an intrinsic and necessary, though not sufficient, constituent of 
genius.
36
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Technological enchantment can be mapped on to the Kantian formulation of the aesthetic 
experience in other ways, too. Both original and irreducible to routinisation, the product of 
genius constitutes a cognitive conundrum. The viewer struggles to establish a heuristic that 
might offer a principle of interpretation, and is compelled to remain within the under- (or 
over-)determined state of aesthetic judgement. Kant, of course, sees this process as 
invigorating, as sharpening the cognitive faculties and the interplay between the 
imagination and the understanding, whereas Gell sees it as destabilising, as a tool in 
manipulating and gaining control over others. Nevertheless, despite their different 
evaluations, there are key structural similarities in their accounts. I shall return to the 
implications of this later, for while enormously suggestive, it also presents potentially 
serious problems for Gell’s declared aim of stripping the anthropology of art of any residual 
notion of cross-cultural aesthetic appreciation.  
 
Much of Gell’s argument is based on a particular reading of ornament, which he describes 
as ‘unfinished business.’ It is ‘unfinished’ inasmuch as the technical, formal and 
specifically ornamental complexity of the art object exceeds the viewer’s ability to organise 
the visual field. Gell focuses on the presence or absence of redundancy. I use ‘redundancy,’ 
following Gregory Bateson, to denote the repetitive and logical pattern that enables one to 
infer a larger whole from a small interrupted part, and which permits the distinction to be 
drawn between information and mere noise, between meaning and non-meaning.
37
 Bateson 
himself uses the notion to interpret the formal and structural hierarchies of Balinese 
painting,
 38
 and it is also taken up by Gombrich in his reading of ornament and decorative 
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art.
39
 Gell’s argues that it is through a destabilising of the principle of redundancy that 
ornamentation can both entrap the cognising subject and also hold them in a kind of 
cognitive limbo, unsuccessfully trying to construct the framing whole. In other words it 
presents an analogue, of what Kant describes as aesthetic judgement, inasmuch as the 
viewer confronts a similar indeterminacy, a similar resistance to the ability to form a logical 
schema.  
 
So far there is little that might add up to a specifically anthropological theory of art in 
Gell’s understanding of the term. The social dimension is examined in two ways. First, the 
‘unfinished business’ of apotropaic devices, or of ornament in general, their resistance to 
formal or logical closure, is understood as an analogue of social relations. Gell examines 
the example of lime containers of the Iatmul of New Guinea (Figure 3). These function as 
prosthetic extensions of their owners, as objectifications of the person of their owner. What 
this suggests is highly revealing. First, as decorative schemas that are never exhausted, they 
communicate the open-ended nature of personhood – it is in some sense incomplete. 
Second, as mediators of social relations, these and other objects are indicators of the 
incomplete nature of the social. To quote Gell, ‘The essence of exchange, as a binding 
force, is the delay, or lag, between transactions which, if the exchange relation is to endure, 
should never result in perfect reciprocation, but always in some renewed, residual, 
imbalance. So it is with patterns; they slow perception down, or even halt it, so that the 
decorated object is never fully possessed at all, but is always in the process of becoming 
possessed.’
40
 This is a suggestive analogy, but for Gell it is ultimately less significant than 
the question of agency. For whether Trobriand magic or Kantian genius, the impact of art 
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depends, to a large measure, on the imputation of a particular kind of agency to the 
producer.  
 
A number of claims are related to this basic supposition, first of which is the central role 
accorded to the abduction of agency. ‘Abduction’ here denotes a specific kind of post hoc 
inference ‘in which a new empirical rule is created to render predictable what would 
otherwise be mysterious …’
41
 The mystery in question is how the cognitively viscous 
artefacts known as art came into existence. Borrowing from Piercean semiotics, Gell 
regards the art object as an index – or causal sign - of agency, within a complex of social 
relations Gell terms the ‘art nexus.’ This point is crucial, for it marks out Gell’s account in 
that it privileges the index over the other two kinds of sign in Pierce’s scheme, the 
(aesthetic) icon and the (conventional) symbol.42 
 
Within the art nexus there are four basic roles –  artist, art object (index), prototype (or 
referent) and recipient – which exist in a variety of permutations depending on whether 
they are either acting as social agents, i.e. the causal origin of a social transaction, or as 
‘patients’, i.e. the object causally affected by the agent’s action. I reproduce the table below 
(Figure 4). 
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A substantial portion of Art and Agency is devoted to detailing the numerous combinations 
of agent – patient relations. It also offers complex and convoluted hierarchies of agent – 
patient relations in examples as diverse as nail fetish figures from the Congo (Figure 5) and 
Mary Richardson’s slashing of the Rokeby Venus in 1914. I do not intend to examine these 
in detail. In broad, however, the theory of the art nexus suggests that while the abduction of 
agency is central, any one of the four roles can occupy the position of agent and, 
contrariwise, that of patient. Thus while the art object is most usually deemed to be a 
patient in relation to the artist, i.e. it is the artist that works and transforms the materials, 
there are numerous cases in which the index itself becomes an agent, in dictating to the 
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artist, for example, the particular form the work can and cannot take. Gell cites the case of 
inhabitants of the Antilles who, according to Christopher Columbus, believed that trees 
dictated to the artist how to shape the trunk into wooden idols. More recent examples, such 
as the modernist ideology of truth to materials also fall into this category. At another 
extreme the artist is both the agent and patient within the same event, so-called ‘ballistic’ 
behaviour, or ‘muscular performances which take place at a rate such that cognitive 
processing of the “outcome” of action only takes place after the act is complete…’
43
 Within 
such behaviour – which might be described using Polányi’s concept of ‘tacit knowledge’ – 
the effect of one’s own agency is as if that of another.
44
 As Gell notes with reference to the 
act of drawing: ‘Because one’s hand is not actually directly controlled by the visualized or 
anticipated line that one wants to draw, but by some mysterious muscular alchemy which is 
utterly opaque to introspection, the line which appears on the paper is always something of 
a surprise. At this point one is a spectator of one’s own efforts at drawing; that is, one has 
become a patient.’
45
 
 
The art nexus thus provides a matrix within which both Western and non-Western art can 
be located as a social practice. What is notable in this account is that the concepts of agency 
and personhood become radically expanded. Agency is no longer equated solely with the 
causal nexus surrounding the artist; the recipient, the artwork and the prototype can also 
function as agents within the art nexus. The notion of the person is also widened by means 
of the idea of distributed personhood, which Gell derives, in part, from Roy Wagner’s 
notion of the ‘fractal person.’
46
 Art objects function within the social transactions of the art 
nexus because they are treated not merely as social agents but as persons, and this stems 
Published in: Art History Vol. 28 No. 4 (Autumn 2005) pp. 524-51. 
 
19 
 
from the fact that as indexes of the agency of the artist, recipient, or prototype, they 
constitute an extension of that person. Personhood is dispersed through the indexical signs 
of its efficacy as a social agent. This also echoes an argument put forward in his analysis of 
tattoos, drawing attention to their role in the multiplication of social personhood; 
 
The basic schema of tattooing is thus definable as the exteriorization of the interior 
which is simultaneously the interiorization of the exterior. One can understand this as 
a process of involution, the creation of an extra layer by folding the skin over upon 
itself … This double skin, folded over on itself, creates the possibility of an endless 
elaboration of interacting components of the social person. The body multiplies; 
additional organs and subsidiary selves are created; spirits, ancestors, rulers and 
victims take up residence in an integument which begins to take on a life of its own.47 
 
Gell is thereby also attempting to circumvent the tendency, within Western social theory, to 
focus on the problematic relation between individual subject and social totality. With the 
notion of ‘distributed personhood,’ the person as social agent is always already dispersed 
and multiple. Examining the case of genealogical idols from the Cook Islands, Gell notes: 
‘Any individual person is “multiple” in the sense of being the precipitate of a multitude of 
genealogical relationships, each of which is instantiated in his/her person; and conversely, 
an aggregate of persons, such as a lineage or tribe, is “one person” in consequence of being 
one genealogy.’
48
 And citing Wagner he adds: ‘A fractal person is never a unit standing in 
relation to an aggregate, or an aggregate standing relation to a unit, but always an entity 
with relationship integrally implied. Perhaps the most concrete illustration of integral 
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relationship comes from the generalised notion of reproduction and genealogy. People exist 
reproductively by being “carried” as part of another, and “carry” or engender others by 
making themselves genealogical or reproductive” factors” of these others. A genealogy is 
thus an enchainment of people …’49 The example of genealogy is perhaps unconvincing – 
it underplays the extent to which genealogies can become fixed social institutions - but the 
overall thrust of the argument merits serious attention. Its aim is to retain the notion of 
agency, not by trying to defend a residual notion of subjectivity from the numerous anti-
humanist critiques levelled at it, but by rethinking the concepts of agency and personhood. 
Agency can be retained if one ceases to equate it with humanist notions of the human 
subject. 
 
Critical Issues 
 
Gell has not been without his detractors. Critics have identified a number of important 
weaknesses in Gell’s book. These include: an overestimation of the importance of 
decorative art (and a concomitant underplaying of the role of figurative representations); a 
naïve use of ethnographic evidence; a lack of a coherent account of aesthetic value; an 
unnecessary exclusion of iconic and symbolic meaning.
50
 Art and Agency is also open to 
charges of inconsistency, for Gell engages in a lengthy discussion of that most aesthetic of 
anthropological categories: style, having begun with a call for the exclusion of such 
concepts.  
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While, in Gell’s defence, one should highlight that Art and Agency is a first draft – it was 
written over a period of just three weeks – these are important weaknesses. In particular, 
the attention to style is inconsistent with his general position, although this is not fatal to his 
account, for the theory of the art nexus makes no reference to style. The issue of decorative 
art is perhaps more important, but as I suggest below, the concept of enchantment might be 
refigured in a way that mitigates this limitation. Furthermore, since the art nexus is a meta-
level concept, it can be defended against the criticism of the lack of interest in aesthetic 
values, for it designates a structure that encompasses both aesthetical and magical 
transactions. Yet Gell’s work has other weaknesses, too. Consequently, before considering 
its positive implications it is necessary to explore some of the difficulties it presents, in 
order to reconstruct it in a more viable form.  
 
The theory of the art nexus suggests that cross-cultural analysis is possible, but at the cost 
of giving up traditional frames of analysis. Indeed, it suggests that analysis of the art of 
non-Western cultures also entails a relinquishing of traditional schemata for the 
understanding of Western art. At the same time, it arguably fails to break free entirely from 
the hold of aesthetics. As a technology of enchantment, the captivating power of art stems 
from its display of technical efficacy and skill. This account has a suspiciously aesthetic 
and formalist character; the theory of enchantment could easily be equated with that of the 
sublime which, from Kant onwards, has been seen as definitive of the experience of 
artworks.
51
 Technological captivation would thus be the enactment of an ethnographic 
sublime.  
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Gell might be defended against this charge in two ways, perhaps. First, while there is an 
apparent parallel with Kantian and post-Kantian theories of the aesthetic, the theory of 
technological enchantment is aimed less at elaborating a specific kind of experience – 
indeed it could be regarded as under-theorised in his description –  than at the analysis of 
the social function of such a captivation through art. In this respect, while from one 
perspective is stands comparison with formalist aesthetic notions, it also bears a more than 
passing resemblance to Althusserian notions of interpellation.
52
 Few would see in 
Althusserian theories of image response a revival of Kantian themes, and hence Gell’s 
account of enchantment might be ‘de-aestheticised’ if seen in these terms. Gell is not 
specifically interested in ideology as a category of analysis, nor in the specific notion of 
subject formation that is an intrinsic part of the concept of interpellation; his adoption of the 
theory of ‘distributed personhood’ clearly distinguishes his account from Althusserian 
theories. Nor is he concerned with the institutional structures of modern societies that 
motivate Althusser. Nevertheless, the theory of interpellation does at least suggest that 
‘enchantment’ need not be thought of as an aesthetic category. Indeed, Gell’s work can also 
be freed of Kantian echoes if it is recalled that the concept of redundancy, while employed 
by Gombrich in relation to ornamental art, originates in communication theory and is 
primarily intended to account for the logic of communication and meaning. Thus, for 
Bateson, redundancy is virtually identical with meaning: ‘I would argue that the concept of 
“redundancy” is at least a partial synonym for “meaning.” As I see it, if the receiver can 
guess at missing parts of the message, then those parts which are received must, in fact, 
carry a meaning which refers to the missing parts and is information about those parts.’
53
 
One might now demur at Bateson’s equation of communication with the simple 
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transmission and receipt of ‘information’ – current communication theory would dispute 
this view – but the crucial point here is that redundancy is not simply a matter of aesthetic 
pattern recognition, but of interpretation in general.
54
 
 
It is still necessary to address the disproportionate role accorded to decoration and 
ornamentation in Gell’s writing. It is clear that this is motivated by the ornamental nature of 
the kind of art Gell takes as his primary material – despite his strictures against the 
ghettoisation of ‘ethnographic’ art. Yet if the notion of enchantment is extended in the way 
suggested by the concept of interpellation, the tie to the limited domain of ornamental art is 
dissolved. This does present problems for the reliance on redundancy as a key determinant 
of enchantedness, but this is in keeping with Gell’s emphasis on the role of the art nexus as 
a whole, and of the complex relations between the social actors involved. In the case of 
many art forms captivation can be seen as an effect of certain agent – patient relations. In 
societies where agency is lodged with the artist, admiration of technical skill is a prime 
component of enchantedness, but in others, where agency is lodged with, for example, the 
prototype, enchantedness has a quite different root. As Hans Belting has argued in regard to 
medieval and Byzantine icons, a similar conception was held for much of the post-classical 
era:  
 
Every image, no matter of what kind, originated in a prototype, in which it was 
contained in essence (by dynamis) from the outset. As an impression belonged to a 
seal and a shadow or a reflection to a body, so a likeness belonged to a model. The 
image was thereby taken away from the caprice of the painter and related to its 
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archetype. By adopting the essence of the archetype, the image borrowed the 
supernatural power that justified its worship.
55
  
 
This notion underlay both the cult of images and the vehemence of the iconoclasts’ 
campaign against icons. Michael Camille has summarised this situation succinctly: ‘to want 
to destroy a false image one had to believe in its evil efficacy, its power over self as well as 
over the Other.’
56
 
 
Some of these issues have been explored by Suzanne Küchler in relation to knots in Tahiti, 
Hawaii and New Ireland.
57
 Given Gell’s recurrent use of metaphors of ensnaring and 
binding, the knot is a particularly useful subject of analysis, most especially since Celtic 
knot work is mentioned in Art and Agency as an example of the technology of enchantment. 
As a ‘knowledge technology’ knots are, for Küchler, ‘responsible for externalising non-
spatial logical problems in a distinctly spatial manner.’
58
 The knot is a metaphor for the 
complex social bonds in certain societies and in Hawaii knot-weaving traditionally played a 
key role in the installation of the king and during his subsequent reign. It symbolised the 
role of the king as a ‘braider’ of the social strands of society. Moreover, not only did the 
knot symbolise the social relations between the kind and his subjects, it also perpetuated 
them. As Küchler argues, ‘The capacity of the knot to fashion a decentred spatial cognition 
is of paramount importance for understanding how knotted effigies can visually and 
conceptually effect a “body politic” that appears once phenomenal and yet also mystical in 
nature.’
59
 The geometrical and topological complexity of the knot confirms the mystery of 
kingship, suggesting an intertwining of the phenomenal, visible, figure of the king and the 
Published in: Art History Vol. 28 No. 4 (Autumn 2005) pp. 524-51. 
 
25 
 
invisible divine powers flowing through the office of the monarch. In a manner parallel to 
the image cult of Byzantium, the complexity of the knot is not simply due to the skill of the 
braider, but rather stems from its function as an index of its divine prototype. 
 
It is also necessary to address the objection that technical complexity has seldom been the 
prime source for the social efficacy of artworks; as Ross Bowden has pointed out in 
criticism of Gell, there are numerous cases where the technical virtuosity of artists has been 
celebrated, while their conceptual and aesthetic originality remained in question.
60
 
Aesthetic admiration can never be based on technical brilliance alone, yet much depends on 
the definition of technical virtuosity. Bowden limits ‘skill’ to purely technical 
accomplishment, but it can be expanded. For by ‘skill’ is meant both purely technical 
accomplishments and also those higher levels qualities of aesthetic and conceptual 
originality.  
 
Yet, if the role Gell accords to skill and technique can be defended, other questions still 
remain. Central to these is the definition of ‘art.’ Partly in order to side-step the issue of 
aesthetics, and partly also because of his suspicions of the museographical gaze, Gell 
brackets out the question of what art might be. Indeed, he argues that ‘art’ is anything that 
functions as an index of social agency within the ‘art nexus,’ and as I have noted before, he 
is critical of scholars working in the field for their limited association of ‘art’ with 
‘artefacts.’ 
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Gell’s anti-essentialism clearly aligns his anthropology of art with parallel notions in the 
field of art theory and criticism and, in particular, institutional theories of art.
61
 Like those 
theories, too,  it arguably restates the problem at a higher level. Instead of questions about 
the specificity of the art object, the debate now moves on to consideration of how the ‘art 
nexus’ is distinguishable from other matrices of social interaction. The clearest response is 
to argue that the ‘art nexus’ constitutes a matrix within which social relations and 
interaction are mediated by artefacts, whether ‘museographic’ artefacts, or phenomena of 
nature. However, there are many other instances of objects functioning as extensions of 
social agents, and as crucial mediators of social interaction, without them being considered 
works of art. Economic relationships and interactions, for example, revolve entirely around 
mediating artefacts and symbols. However, the question is then raised as to how such 
interactions are mediated, and here the ‘art nexus’ is distinguished by virtue of the central 
role of enchantment, which holds together the four functions of agency, patient, recipient 
and index; this quadripolar matrix of social relations is not replicated in other kinds of 
social interaction.  
 
Gell’s theory should thus not be seen as depending on any single factor – artwork, 
enchantment, art nexus – but on the interplay between them. Moreover the question as to 
specificity of the art nexus is not quite parallel to that of art and the aesthetic. The art nexus 
is a meta-concept; some ‘art’ transactions will be coded as aesthetic, some as magical and 
others as religious and so forth.This might be amplified by reference to Gell’s response to a 
well known study by the British anthropologist Jeremy Coote on the cattle of the Dinka of 
the Sudan (Figure 5).
62
 Where Coote had stressed the significance of cattle as a measure of 
Published in: Art History Vol. 28 No. 4 (Autumn 2005) pp. 524-51. 
 
27 
 
the aesthetic preferences of the Dinka – and hence of a Dinka ‘aesthetics’ - Gell stressed the 
intertwining of ‘aesthetic’ values and other social factors – in particular, the competition for 
prestige amongst the young male cattle-herders of the Dinka. For Gell one cannot identify a 
specific aesthetic system without artificially separating it from the larger transactional 
nexus to which it belongs.  
 
An Art Historical Discourse? 
 
Up to this point I have considered Gell’s work primarily in relation to the traditional subject 
matter of the anthropology of art, namely, art in small-scale societies.  It is timely, 
therefore, to turn to the broader applicability of Gell’s work, and to consider the gains 
accruing from such an application. It is especially pertinent in that his critique of traditional 
anthropological aesthetics is in part motivated by the concern to introduce as elastic a 
notion of artwork as that operating within Western art criticism, commensurate with the 
practices of 20
th
 century modernism and the avant-garde. In addition, following Gell’s 
acknowledged debt to Bourdieu, the theory of the art nexus parallels the numerous calls for 
a reorientation of art history towards analysis of the ideological and institutional frame of 
art at the expense of traditional concerns with individual artworks.
63
 Yet while there are 
clear affinities between the calls for an end to ‘traditional’ art theory and the critique of 
anthropological aesthetics, it is important to recognise their differences. Where, in the wake 
of writers such as T. J. Clark, Victor Burgin or Craig Owens, art history and theory have 
turned increasingly to art as a social institution, Gell’s work focuses on micro-social 
interactions involving the art nexus. His work is both narrower in focus and, paradoxically, 
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potentially wider in application; while the art nexus was developed to account for a range 
of phenomena within the traditional domain of the anthropology of art, it can be seen as 
providing a meta-discourse that illuminates various issues in art practice and theory in 
Western societies. In the remainder of this article I explore a few cases. 
 
An instructive example can be seen in theories of the historicity of representation. In his 
account of the viewing of artworks – the phenomenon of enchantment – Gell is partly 
informed by David Freedberg’s wide-ranging study of image response, The Power of 
Images.
64
 Freedberg’s work is a rich source of historical information about changing 
patterns of image response and it can be located alongside a growing body of scholarship 
on image reception, from the theoretical work of Wolfgang Kemp to that of Belting 
mentioned earlier.65 Key to his account of image response is the analysis of the inter-
relation of image response and image theory. The auratic power of images is directly 
founded in their function not merely in depicting the subject, but in making the subject co-
present with the image.  
 
Freedberg’s book offers a timely reminder of the intertwining of image response and theory 
– in a study which points both to the mutability of the response to art, and also to the 
historical and cultural specificity of aesthetic experience. At the same time, however, it is 
open to methodological critique, for it is arguably rooted in outmoded nineteenth-century 
anthropological notions of art. Specifically, it sees pre-modern art in magical and cultic 
terms, positing a caesura between modernity and the pre-modern in terms of the break from 
cultic ritual. According to this account, image responses that evoke cultic practices are 
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relics or survivals of an earlier stage in cultural development. In such accounts art is 
connected with magic, which is seen as operative in (‘primitive’) technologically 
underdeveloped societies. Within anthropology such an opposition of modern technology 
and primitive magic has long been disputed, but as Freedberg’s book indicates, it has been 
central to writing on art.66 It is evident, for example, in Walter Benjamin’s discussion of 
technological reproduction, whose positing of a cultic origin to art remains one of the least 
questioned claims of the entire essay.
67
 One can go back a little further and see a reflex of 
such a notion in the writings of Aby Warburg and Julius von Schlosser. For Warburg the 
history of representation could be mapped by tracing the oscillations between a regression 
to primitive cultic violence, on the other hand, and a rationalising modernising impulse on 
the other. A primitive cultural unconscious thus always lay close to the surface of Western 
modernity.68 Schlosser drew on a similar conceptual schema in his study of the history of 
wax effigies; for Schlosser the persistence of wax portraiture into the 19
th
 century, with the 
extraordinary mimetic properties of the image suggesting not merely a representation of the 
sitter but their actual presence, was evidence of the survival of a primitive inability to 
distinguish between the real and its representation.
69
 Schlosser thus argues that the extreme 
realism of the wax portrait was linked to a belief in the demonic and magical inhabitant of 
the image. 
 
According to this account there is an absolute difference between the primitive cult of the 
image-as-presence and the modern notion of image-as-representation. The shift from one to 
the other occurred, for Schlosser, with the rise of neo-classical aesthetics in the 18
th
 
century. In his study of the image cult Belting locates the shift occurred in the early 16
th
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century, but a similar framework holds: any practice or discourse that stands between is 
cast as an intermediate stage, or as a ‘survival’ of earlier magical, cultic practices – a term 
often employed in Victorian anthropology. Echoes of such a notion can also be detected in 
Michel Foucault’s work on the history of truth regimes. Although there is no talk of relics, 
survivals or magical cults, Foucault’s tracing of the shift from the Renaissance regime of 
representation based on resemblance to the metonymic régime of the Classic Age posits an 
absolute difference between two heterogeneous and incommensurable representational 
systems.
70
 
 
The work of Gell suggests an alternative means of conceptualising this phenomenon. The 
theory of the art nexus posits a reconfiguration of relationships, and in particular, a shift 
from a theory in which, following Gell’s terminology, agency is no longer exercised by the 
prototype but rather by the artist. Of course the shift may be coded in terms of the waning 
of magic and its displacement by agnostic humanist notions of creativity, but to see in this a 
deeper cognitive or representational shift is to underplay the extent to which other relations 
within the art nexus, between, for example, recipient and index, or between index and 
recipient, may well remain the same. It also overestimates the significance of one particular 
shift when, arguably, equally significant shifts in the art nexus have occurred since; during 
the twentieth century one recurrent aesthetic ideology, the formalist doctrine of ‘truth to 
materials,’ shifted agency away from the artist to the index. One could add to this 
consideration of the role of the recipient as agent. Though couched in an unfamiliar 
terminology, the idea of the recipient as agent is familiar to traditional art historical 
discourse; the numerous studies of patronage offer ample testimony to this. While in some 
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cases patronage is seen simply as a mediating factor in the production of art, in others the 
patron is seen as the primary cause of the art, determining the content, iconological 
programme and the material and formal basis of artworks, alongside dominant styles and 
taste. Moreover, if the recipient can be seen in terms of the role of the patron, it can also be 
considered in terms of the spectator. One might mention here not only Roland Barthes’ 
widely recognised theoretical claim concerning the constitutive role of the reader / viewer 
in the formation of artistic meaning, but also the numerous historical practices, from the 
performances of Marina Abramović and Yoko Ono to the compositions of Karlheinz 
Stockhausen of Luciano Berio – open works in Eco’s formulation - which actively solicit 
the involvement of the audience such that the latter becomes both the patient and the agent 
of its completion.71 
 
The shifting functions of agency can also be seen when considering the figure of the artist, 
which has enjoyed a complex relation to the question of the agent. At one extreme it is 
evident, from the Homeric invocation of the muse in the opening lines of the Iliad and the 
Odyssey, that the author figure was, according to an early Greek tradition, a conduit for the 
telling of mythic narrative, rather than its originator or instigating agent. In the terms of the 
art nexus one might state that the Homeric poet is a patient, with agency exercised either by 
the prototype – the mythic world – or by the index – the narrative tells itself through the 
muse. In this sense artistry is immersed in a mythic world of extra-human powers and 
agents which, in the schema of Victorian anthropology, would have confirmed the 
rootedness of Greek art in more ancient primitive cultic practice. Such a conclusion was 
indeed reached by figures such as Nietzsche, Jane Harrison or Aby Warburg.
72
 Yet this 
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notion was also accompanied by a mythology of the artist as an occult technician. Both in 
the Homeric poems – in the accomplishments of the god Hephaistos - and more generally, 
too, in figures such as that of Daidalos, the artist is a kind of magician wielding 
extraordinary skills and capacities.73 Clearly an important shift has occurred, in which 
agency has been transferred to the artist from the prototype or the index. And this can be 
seen as continuing into classical times where the extraordinarily illusionary effects of the 
paintings of Apollodorus or Zeuxis are no longer attributed to magic but to technical skill.
74
 
 
The obvious question to ask is: what difference it makes to frame authorial agency in these 
terms. In response it is important to note, first, that there are competing readings of this 
shift. One reading has drawn on such myths to foreground the magical origins of art.75 For 
this interpretation the idea of the artist as magician is a continuation of the notion of art as 
the voice of other occult forces – Homeric muses – and is structurally linked to the magical 
and cultic identification of the image with its subject. The later heroisation of the artist in 
classical times and Renaissance Humanism can thus be seen as a survival of such magical 
conceptions. A similar notion appears in Barthes’ famous thesis on authorship, which posits 
humanist notions of the author as theological in origin.
76
 From the perspective of the theory 
of the art nexus, the fact that the production of art is coded in magical or technological 
terms is not as significant as the changing relations of the four factors – artist, index, 
prototype and recipient – in the nexus.  
 
This helps rethink certain debates concerning the ideological function of art. According to a 
well established argument, one of the ideological effects of art lies in its ability to mask the 
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labour of production, naturalising the image, for example, as a window onto the visible.
77
 
This also provides the basis, according to this argument, for the ideological underpinning of 
the Western mimetic tradition and, in particular, its amenability to employment as an 
instrument for legitimising cultural and social hegemony.  
 
 It is undoubtedly the case that certain kinds of art practice foreground the process of 
production – the fauvist paintings of Matisse, Derain or Vlaminck, the films of Andy 
Warhol – while others minimise it. But to attribute this ideological function to the image 
alone relies on a problematic fetishism of the artwork. A key role is also played by the 
location of agency. In a culture where the primary agent is held to be the prototype or the 
recipient, the ‘naturalising’ function of the mimetic artwork will differ from cases where 
agency is located in the artist. In the case of the latter, although the artist’s skills in, for 
example, depicting their subject ‘realistically,’ are admired, it is by no means apparent that 
the work is then seen as an ahistorical window onto the visible world. The effect of the real 
is as much a consequence of the recognition of the labour of production as of a masking of 
it; the agency of van Eyck (Figure 6) or Ingres – their mimetic skill – is as much in 
evidence as the reflexive foregrounding of the labour of production by, for example, 
Velasquez or Kirchner (Figure 7). Western illusionism is not as powerful an ideological 
instrument as is often supposed. Arguably art, as a technology of enchantment, captivates – 
one might even say ‘interpellates’ -  the viewer not by masking the labour, but by 
displaying it. 
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An equally significant consequence of Gell’s theory stems from its ability to intervene in 
debate on the question of authorship. Specifically, the critique of the author, from Barthes 
and Foucault onwards, has tended to conflate authorship with agency. Recognition of the 
problematic status of humanistic notions of authorship led not merely to a questioning of a 
particular conception of subjectivity but to an erasure of agency per se. The flaws in the 
proposed solutions, in particular, Barthes’ theoretically contradictory and incoherent 
advocacy of the reader and inter-textuality, hardly need stating.
78
 Michael Baxandall has, of 
course, indicated possible means of retaining a commitment to the notion of art as an 
intentional activity without acceding to humanist notions of the kind critiqued by Barthes, 
Foucault and others.
79
 Gell offers another framework for describing agency, making it a 
broader concept than the simple ascription of intention to subjects. His description of 
‘ballistic behaviour’ noted above can be adduced in this context. ‘Ballistic behaviour’ 
denotes the process where the artist stands in the position of both patient and agent in the 
art nexus. Gell discusses this phenomenon in physiological terms, but it can also be used as 
a means of conceptualising certain conceptions of artistic production. Most immediately the 
ideology of automatism replicates exactly this phenomenon, but so too does Vasari’s 
recommendation that ‘the best thing is to draw men and women from the nude and thus fix 
in the memory by constant exercise the muscles of the torso, back, legs and knees, with the 
bones underneath.’80 In other words, through routinisation, one is an agent without 
conscious intention.  
  
Conclusion 
 
Published in: Art History Vol. 28 No. 4 (Autumn 2005) pp. 524-51. 
 
35 
 
I began this discussion with the problematics of cultural difference, and in particular, the 
difficulties involved in the application of Western art discourses to the understanding of 
non-Western art. The weaknesses of certain aestheticising and historicising practices have 
led to the positing of an absolute non-commensurability. As even an initial consideration of 
Gell might suggest, there are other frameworks of analysis that can overcome this 
conceptual impasse. Although formulated in response to specific debates in anthropology, 
Gell’s attempt to analyse art as an actor in the formation of social relations can clearly be 
mapped on to the terrain of Western art. In addition, it poses significant questions to certain 
methodological assumptions sustaining current social theories of Western art. It also 
presents a schema for the cross-cultural analysis of art that begins to lay out the grounds for 
the identification of some sort of commensurability. Nevertheless, various observations 
remain. 
 
The theory of the art nexus operates at a level of abstraction and taxonomic codification 
that presents difficulties for the analysis of concrete practices. What it also suggests, 
however, is the compromise necessary to maintain any cross-cultural discourse; 
commensurability emerges through an attaining of distance while, correlatively, immersion 
in a cultural practice will tend to confirm the idea of non-commensurability. The key issue 
concerns the question as to whether the abstraction involved in the theory of the art nexus 
involves such a level of generality as to render it problematic as a tool of analysis. While it 
operates at a certain level of generalised abstraction, this is arguably much less than was the 
case with Summers or Anderson mentioned earlier; indeed, it is no more so than the ‘high 
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theory’ of Foucault, post-structuralism or deconstruction, all of which have been of 
enormous recent significance for the analysis of art. 
 
The second issue is that of interdisciplinarity. Within art history the espousal of 
interdisciplinarity has a long tradition. As early as 1894 Ernst Grosse claimed that ‘the most 
immediate and pressing task for the social history of art is the investigation of primitive 
art,’
81
 while Aby Warburg conducted his celebrated ethnographical study of the Pueblo 
Indians in 1896. However, such notions have often been limited to the adoption of a value 
system that privileges alterity, rather than involving a proper engagement with the methods 
of other disciplines. Taking the work of Gell seriously implies a deeper level of disciplinary 
engagement, which involves not merely the adoption of a different set of values but also a 
different methodological framework that would lead to a transformation of art historical 
practice.  
 
Third, Gell’s work was motivated by a concern to maintain and fortify a disciplinary 
boundary, namely, that of anthropology. Yet despite that original motivation it is clear that 
a properly anthropological theory of art – in Gell’s sense of the term – is of potentially 
enormous consequence for other discourses on the subject. Pace Gell, the theory of the art 
nexus needs to be taken out of the ‘ghetto’ of anthropology. Fourth, and finally, the art 
nexus is undoubtedly a Western representational apparatus. Yet its distance from the 
specificities of Western art practices gives it a cross-cultural currency that other aesthetic 
theories cannot claim to possess. As an apparatus of Western academic discourse it is 
ultimately still vulnerable to the familiar accusation of imposing occidental logical 
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schemata on other cultures. Nevertheless, it makes an important intervention into the debate 
as to the kinds of questions that might be posed and opens up discussion to new 
possibilities.  
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